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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

o

EUROPEAN AMERICAN REALTY, LTD.
and SCOTT K. TOBERMAN,
Plaintiffs,
v.

DAVID LANG,
Defendant.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

FILED IN OFFICE
I

AUG 312007
QEP

Civil Action File No.

2005-

U1Y cLERK SUPERIOR COufIT
fIlL10N COUNT( GA

- 05849

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & MOTION TO STRIKE
TESTIMONY

The above-styled case is before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary
judgment, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims, and
Defendant's motion to strike contradictory testimony. The Court held a hearing on these

o

motions on August 23, 2007. Plaintiffs European American Realty, LTD ("EAR") and
Scott K. Toberman ("Mr. Tob.erman") did not participate in the hearing.

After

considering the briefs filed on behalf of the parties (including Plaintiffs'), the case record,
and the oral argument presented by Defendant, the Court finds as follows:

I.

Facts
This case arises from Defendant Lang's final months of employment with EAR,

his termination from EAR, and the months following his termination. The undisputed
facts, which form the basis of this Order, are summarized below.
Defendant Lang was an Executive Vice President of EAR and worked closely
with Mr. Toberman overseeing the development and sales of condominiums. EAR, Mr.
Toberman, and Mr. Lang also worked with VEF V Holdings LLC ("VEF") and the

C)
1

entities referred to as the GEF Partnerships' on three (3) condo conversion projects. In

o

addition to the condo conversion projects, the parties were jointly involved in other
business ventures. For example, VEF acted as a lender to La Tour Partners LLC (in
which Mr. Lang claims an indirect ownership interest), Austerlitz Partners LLC (in which
Mr. Lang claims to be a member and an indirect owner), and Bonapart Partners LLC (in
which Mr. Lang claims an indirect ownership interest through his ownership interest in
Austerlitz). Mr. Toberman and/or EAR hold a primary ownership interest in each of the
three (3) companies to which VEF acted as a lender. The GEF Partnerships, through
their investment in Montrachet Partnership LLC, also hold an ownership interest in
Bonapart Partners LLC, in addition to other Mr. TobermanlEAR controlled entities.
In the spring of 2005, a dispute arose between Mr. Toberman and the GEF

()

Partnerships, which ultimately resulted in Mr. Toberman and the GEF Partnerships
entering into a binding term sheet (the "BTS"). In the BTS, Mr. Toberman agreed to pay
to the GEF Partnerships cash, real estate, interests in condominium project, and
partnership interests in exchange for a release of potential claims against him. The BTS
contained a confidentiality provision that stated:
This term sheet shall be kept confidential and not disclosed
to any third parties, except as may be necessary (i) to the
parties' respective partners, members, attorneys, agents,
employees, accountants and banks, (ii) to comply with the
terms hereof or to enforce the rights and/or obligations of
the parties hereto, or (iii) in response to any court order or
lawful subpoena.

o

I The GEF Partnerships include Mr. Gootrad, Mr. Engerrnan. & Mr. Frishman, individually, and their
various entities.

2

o

In April of 2005, Mr. Toberman and Mr. Lang had a conference call with Kenneth
Kraft, Esq., counsel to EAR at the time. Mr. Kraft advised Mr. Lang and Mr. Toberman
to disclose to VEF the dispute2 between Mr. Toberman and the GEF Partnerships.
On July 24, 2005, Mr. Lang met with Mr. Huang, CFO of VEF. During this
meeting, Mr. Lang disclosed the dispute between Mr. Toberman and the GEF
Partnerships, and showed him the BTS. On July 29, 2005, Mr. Huang circulated an
action plan to Mr. Gootrad, a primary investor in the GEF Partnerships, to mitigate the
effects of the dispute on outstanding condo conversion projects. Mr. Huang's plan
included having Mr. Lang create a new management company to oversee the final stages
of the condo conversion projects. During a conference call on August 3, 2005, Mr.
Huang, Mr. Toberman, and Mr. Gootrad discussed the outstanding condo conversion

o

projects. Mr. Huang stated in his affidavit that during this conversation, the three men
agreed that Mr. Lang would form a new company to finish the projects. On August 4,
2005, William Beltman, attorney for EAR and Mr. Toberman, sent an email to counsel
for the GEF Partnerships which proposed that Mr. Lang was to form a new entity and
then hire Thomas Spiro, a then-current EAR employee, to finish the condo conversion
projects and which stated that Mr. Huang agreed to the proposed restructuring.
There is no dispute that Mr. Toberman was aware that Mr. Lang was planning to
form a new company, and that Mr. Lang intended to offer Mr. Spiro a position with the
new company. On August 4, 2005, Mr. Toberman discussed this potential job offer with
Mr. Spiro and asked to be informed of the details. On August 4,2005, Mr. Lang offered
Mr. Spiro ajob with the new company. Mr. Lang, however, never formed a new

o

, Mr. Lang provided deposition testimony that Mr. Kraft encouraged the disclosure of the TobermaniGEF
Partnerships dispute to VEF. Mr. Toberman provided an affidavit that Mr. Kraft did not encourage
disclosure of the BTS to VEF.
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o

company; consequently, Mr. Spiro was not hired. By August 26,2005,' Mr. Lang's
relationship with Mr. Toberman and employment with EAR were terminated.
On September 22,2005, Kevin Dorr, an at-will EAR employee, sent a letter to
Mr. Lang. at Mr. Lang's request, describing the financial and operating conditions of the
Discovery Palms condos, which was one of the three (3) ongoing condo conversion
projects.
On September 26,2005, Mr. Lang's EAR email account was accessed and an
August 18, 2005, email chain containing the budget of the Discovery Palms project was
forwarded to Lisa Richards, another EAR employee who was working with GEF
Partnerships to supply them with information of Mr. Toberman's alleged embezzlement.
That same day, Ms. Richards then forwarded the August 18 th email chain to a second

o

email account of Mr. Lang's (dave@earpmi.com),4 and from there the email was sent to
the GEF Partnerships and VEF.

II.

Standard of Law
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must

demonstrate that "there is no genuine issue of material facts, viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, to warrant judgment as a matter of law." Lau's Corp.
v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (1991). See also, Danforth v. Bullman, 276 Ga. 531, 532

(2005).

III.

Defendant David Lang's Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant David Lang brought a motion for summary judgment on all nine (9)

counts of Plaintiffs' complaint.

o

J

There is some dispute in the record about whether Mr. Lang was terminated on August 25 th or August

26th •
4 The dave@earomi.com email account is not the EAR email account. EAR PM! was a separate company
from EAR which was created by Mr. Gootrad and in which Mr. Lang had an email account.
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o

A. Counts III and IX, Breach of Duty
Plaintiffs Mr. Tobennan and EAR allege that Mr. Lang breached his fiduciary
duty as an officer of EAR by (I) establishing a competitive company, (2) soliciting EAR
employees, and (3) divulging EAR confidential information. Additionally, Plaintiffs
allege that Mr. Lang breached his duty of good faith to EAR by (4) approaching VEF, a
business contact of EAR.
The internal affairs of foreign corporations are governed by the laws of the state
of incorporation. Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Assoc., Architects and Planners,
Inc., 254 Ga. 734, 735-736 (1985); see also, Multi-Media Holdings. Inc. v. Piedmont 15
LLC, 262 Ga. App. 283 (2003). EAR is a corporation fonned under the laws of the state
of Illinois. Obligations of officers and fiduciary duties are questions of internal affairs;
thus, the breach of duty counts shall be evaluated under Illinois law. Id.; see also,

()

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAW § 309 (2007).
Under Illinois law, a corporate officer owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their
corporate employer not to exploit their position for their own gain (self-dealing) or to
impede the operation of the corporation (obstacle to corporate objectives). The following
are examples of officer fiduciary duty breaches under Illinois law:
(1) fail[ing] to inform the company that employees are

forming a rival company or engaging in other fiduciary
breaches; (2) solicit[ing] the business of a single customer
before leaving the company; (3) us[ing] the company's
facilities or equipment to assist them in developing their
new business; or (4) solicit[ing] fellow employees to join a
rival business.
Cooper Linse Hallman Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Hallman, 856 N.E. 2d 585,589 (III. App.

o

Ct. 2006). In addition, officers may also breach their fiduciary duty if they use "the
company's confidential business information for the new business, either before or after

5

o

[their] departure." Id. (finding a breach of fiduciary duty for failing to inform the
company of the formation of a competing corporation, soliciting fellow employees,
soliciting business contacts prior to resignation, and using confidential corporate
information); see also, Dowd & Dowd, Ltd, v, Gleason, 816 N.E. 2d 754, 762 (III. App.
Ct. 2004).

1.

Forming a Rival Business & Soliciting EAR Employees
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lang's offer of employment in a new company to Mr.

Spiro while both were employed by EAR breached Mr. Lang's duty of fiduciary duty to
EAR.
Mr. Gootrad, Mr. Huang, and Mr. Lang provided testimony that it was the
agreement of EAR, the GEF Partnerships, and VEF that Mr. Lang would form a new
company to finalize the condo conversion projects. Mr. Toberman also acknowledged

o

that he told Mr. Spiro of Mr. Lang's impending job offer with the new company and
asked him to report back the details of it. Mr. Toberman, however, disputes that Mr,
Lang ever had "authority" to form the new company. Additionally, all of the evidence is
that the new company was not to be a rival company in competition with EAR, but was
to be a company that would facilitate the completion of the three (3) condo conversion
projects put in jeopardy as a result of the TobermaniGEF Partnerships dispute and the
BTS,
Agreement speaks to an understanding or a meeting of the minds whereas
authority speaks to procedures or formal steps to approve an action.5 Thus, this Court
finds that it was agreed that Mr. Lang make plans to form a new company and that he
'Agreement' is defined as "a Illutuaiunde[sianding between two or more persons nbout thdr relative
rights and duties regarding pa ... t or future performances ... " nnd 'authority' is den ned as "(h~ right or
permission to act legally on another's behalf: the power delegated by a principal to an agent:' BLACK'S
LAIVDICTlO1'ARY. 7'" Ed. (1999).

5

C)
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o

subsequently approached Mr. Spiro with the understanding of the parties, including
Plaintiffs. Mr. Lang breached no duty in so acting; even if he did so without
authorization.
Additionally, there is !!Q evidence in the record that Mr. Lang was forming a rival
or competing company. Even though Mr. Lang made plans to form a new company to
assist with the condo conversion projects, he breach no fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiffs
because the new company was not intended to be a rival.
Regardless, even assuming that Mr. Lang did breach a duty owed to Plaintiffs,
Mr. Lang never formed the new company and Mr. Spiro never left EAR. Thus, Plaintiffs
incurred no damages. Summary judgment is appropriate where, regardless of any breach,
plaintiff suffered no damages. Grot v. First Bank of Schaumburg, 684 N.E.2d 1016, 1017

o

(Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (affirming a trial court's grant of summary judgment regardless of
whether or not defendants breached a fiduciary duty because the plaintiffs suffered no
damages "cognizable at law".).

2.

DivulgiIig Confidential EAR Information
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lang breached his fiduciary duty when he disclosed to

VEF's Mr. Huang the terms of the BTS during their July meeting. The BTS contained a
confidentiality provision that allowed disclosure to the parties' "partners, members,
attorneys, agents, employees, accountants and banks." The BTS was entered into by Mr.
Toberman, his wife, Beth Toberman, the Toberman Entities, and the GEF Partnerships.
VEF was EAR's partner in the three condo conversion projects and acted as a lender to
both La Tour Partners LLC, and Austerlitz Partners LLC. EAR, La Tour, and Austerlitz

o

are three (3) of the named businesses defined as the "Toberrnan Entities" in the BTS.
Therefore, the disclosure of the BTS to Mr. Huang was within the contemplated scope of

7

o

the confidentially exception contained in paragraph 2 of the BTS. and breached no duty
owed to by Defendant to Plaintiffs.

3.

Approaching EAR Contacts
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lang breached the duty of good faith that he owed to

Plaintiffs by approaching VEF while he was still employed by EAR.
As stated above. the record is undisputed that Mr. Lang discussed the new
company with Mr. Huang with the agreement of the parties involved. including Mr.
Toberman and EAR. Additionally. Mr. Lang never formed the new company and never
took the business away from EAR. Finally. despite the fact that VEF terminated its
professional relationship with Plaintiffs, Mr. Haung stated in his affidavit that he did not
terminate VEF's relationship with EAR because of Mr. Lang, but as a result of his

o

conversations with Mr. Gootrad concerning the BTS and the underlying dispute that gave
rise to it.
Accordingly, this Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment on
Counts III and IX of Plaintiff s complaint.

B. Count IV, Tortious Interference with Business Relations
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lang tortiously interfered with EAR's business
relationship with VEF when Mr. Lang met with Mr. Huang and disclosed the terms of the
BTS.
To prevail on a claim of tortious interference, the plaintiff must demonstrate that
the defendant (1) acted without privilege, (2) acted with intent to injure, (3) induced a
third party to act, and (4) caused financial injury. Tom's Amusement Co., Inc., v. Total

C)

Vending Servs., 243 Ga. App. 294 (2000); Willis v. United Family Life Ins., 226 Ga.
App. 661, 665 (1997). The first prong, which requires that the defendant acted without

8
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privilege, is commonly referred to as the "stranger doctrine". Under a claim for tortious
interference, the tortfeasor must be a stranger to both the contractual relationship at
question and to the underlying business relationship. Id. at 296.
At the time that Mr. Lang and Mr. Huang met, Mr. Lang was the Executive Vice
President of Acquisitions at EAR and the key contact between EAR and VEF. In
addition, Mr. Lang held ownership interests (whether direct or indirect) in La Tour
Partners LLC, Trafalgar Partners LLC, Austerliz Partners LLC, and Bonapart Partners
LLC, which are companies under the TobermanJEAR umbrella and which had business
relationships with VEF. As such, Mr. Lang was not a "stranger" to EAR's relationship
with VEF.
Accordingly, this Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment on

o

Count IV Plaintiff s complaint.

C. Count VIII, Conspiracy to Breach Fiduciary Duty
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lang induced Kevin DOff, an EAR employee, to breach
his duty to EAR by providing to Mr. Lang the September 22, 2005, letter that contained
confidential financial information related to one of the condo conversion projects. At that
time, Mr. Lang was no longer an EAR employee.
Georgia recently recognized an action for conspiracy to breach fiduciary duty or
for "aiding and abetting" a breach of fiduciary duty. Insight Tech., Inc. v. Freight Check,
LLC, 280 Ga. App. 19 (2006). The elements of a conspiracy to breach fiduciary duty
claim are:

C)

(I) through improper action or wrongful conduct and
without privilege, the defendant acted to procure a breach
of the primary wrongdoer's fiduciary duty to the plaintiff;
(2) with knowledge that the primary wrongdoer owed the
plaintiff a fiduciary duty, the defendant acted purposely and

9
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with malice and the intent to injure; (3) the defendant's
wrongful conduct procured a breach of the primary
wrongdoer's fiduciary duty; and (4) the defendant's tortious
conduct proximately caused damage to the plaintiff.
Id. at 25-26.
Looking at these elements, and the evidence provided, Mr. Lang stated that he
was a member of Montrachet Partnership LLC which was invested in the Discovery
Palms condo conversion project. He therefore was entitled to information regarding the
project.6 Perhaps Mr. Door was not the proper person to disclose the information, but
Mr. Door, "the primary wrongdoer" could have refused to give the information. There is
no evidence in the record that Mr. Lang acted with malice or intent to injure.
Accordingly, this Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment on
Count VIII of Plaintiff s complaint.

o

D. Count V, Computer Theft and Computer Trespass
Plaintiffs allege the Mr. Lang accessed his EAR email account in September, after he

was terminated, and forwarded an email to Ms. Richards. In support of their opposition to
Mr. Lang's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs provided a copy of the email chain
in which an August 18th email was sent from Mr. Lang's EAR email account on
September 26, 2005. Plaintiffs allege that accessing the email account and forwarding
the email violatedD.C.GA. § 16-9-93(a)(3), establishing computer theft and trespass
torts. 7

"A member may: ..... (B) Obtain from time to time upon reasonable demand: (I) True and complete
information regarding the state of the business and financial condition of the limited liability company .. .
(iii) Other information regarding the affairs of the limited liability company as is just and reasonable ... "
O.e.G.A. § 14-Il-314
7 "Any person who uses a computer or computer network with knowledge that such use is without authority
and with the intention of converting property to such person' s use in violation of an agreement or other
legal obligation to make a specified application or disposition of such property shall be gUilty of the crime
of computer theft." O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93(a)(3).
6

o
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o

Mr. Lang provided affidavit testimony that he did not access his EAR account,
that he did not return to the EAR premises after his termination, and that he had no means
to access his EAR account remotely after he was terminated. Ms. Richardson received
the forwarded email on September 26'h and then forwarded it to Mr. Lang's EAR PMI
account (a separate and umelated-to-EAR company). Ms. Richards also provided
affidavit testimony that she may have asked someone to forward her the email from Mr.
Lang's former email account.
Plaintiffs provided no evidence that Me. Lang had access to his EAR email
account or to the premises after his termination. The mere inference that Mr. Lang may
have accessed the account is insufficient in the face of the evidence and the standards on
a motion for summary judgment.

()

Accordingly, this Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment on
Count V of Plaintiff's complaint.

E. Count I, Deceptive Trade Practice Act
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lang violated O.C.G.A. § 10-1-372, the Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, when he wrongfully held himself out as a vice president of EAR,
made misleading statements about EAR, and solicited EAR contacts. 8
Deceptive trade practices are clearly defined under the Act and include actions
such as misrepresenting the origins of goods or services, creating confusion with regard
to sources or sponsorship of goods/services, or incorrectly representing the quality, uses,
or geographic origin of a good/service. O.e.G.A. § 10-1-372. The specific remedy for a

()

8 In oral argument, counsel for Defendant asserted that Plaintiffs had "abandoned" their opposition to
summary judgment on this Count and Counts II, VI, VII by their omission of argument in the briefs on
behalf of Plaintiffs. In light of Plaintiffs' and Plaintiffs' counsel's absence from oral argument, this Court
assumes that Plaintiffs have not abandoned their opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment
on Counts I, II, VI, VII and will evaluate the claims under the appropriate summary judgment standard.

11
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violation of the Act is injunctive relief. Lauria v. Ford Motor Co., 169 Ga. App. 203
(1983) ("While that Act expressly does not preclude other actions based on common law
or other statutory authority, the sole remedy provided under this Act is injunctive
relief. "). Plaintiffs neither allege actions in violation of the Act, nor do they claim
remedies available under the Act.
Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Count I of Plaintiffs
Complaint is GRANTED.

F. Count II, Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lang took EAR contacts, financial data, and confidential
information from EAR when he was terminated, thus misappropriating EAR's trade
secrets.

o

Misappropriation of trade secrets involves (1) the acquisition of a trade secret by a
person who knows (or has reason to know) that the trade secret was acquired by
inappropriate means, or (2) the disclosure of a trade secrete by someone who (a) used
improper means to obtain the trade secret, or (b) at the time of the disclosure knew that
the trade secret was obtained improperly or held with some duty not to disclose it.
CMAXlCleveland, Inc. v. VCR, Inc., 804F. Supp. 337, 358 (M.D. Ga., 1992). O.C.G.A.
§ 10-1-761 defines trade secrets. 9

In deposition testimony, Mr. Toberman identified the BTS as the trade secret
misappropriated by Mr. Lang. The BTS, however, is outside of the definition of trade

O.C.O.A. § 10-1-761 (4) "Trade secret" means information, without regard to form, including, but not
limited to, technical or non-technical data, a formula, a pattern, a compilation, a program, a device, a
method, a technique, a drawing, a process, financial data, financial plans, product plans, or a list of actual
or potential customers or suppliers which is not commonly known by or available to the public and which
information: A) Derives economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use; and (B) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain

9

o

its secrecy."
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secrets under O.e.G.A. § 10-1-76\. In addition, Mr. Lang submitted the deposition
testimony of a Senior VP of EAR (Ms. Brown) and an EAR paralegal (Ms. Black) that
EAR held no trade secrets within the definition ofO.C.G.A. § 10-1-76\. There is no
question of fact regarding Mr. Lang's alleged misappropriation of trade secrets.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment on
Count II of Plaintiffs' complaint.

G. Counts VI and VII, Trespass to Chattels and Conversion
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lang removed physical files belonging to EAR when he
was terminated. In deposition testimony, Mr. Toberman identified only the BTS as the
"missing files" that are the basis of these claims. Mr. Lang was a member in and/or had
an indirect ownership in several of the Toberman Entity signatories to the BTS. Mr.
Lang was also an investor in the condo conversion projects which were assigned to the

C)

GEF Partnerships as a result of the BTS. Accordingly, Mr. Lang had an interest in the
BTS and his possession of such constitutes neither trespass to chattels nor conversion.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment on
Counts VI and VIII of Plaintiffs' complaint.

IV. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant's
Counterclaims
During oral argument, Defendant abandoned Count II (Conversion of LLC
Interests), Count III (Tortious Deprivation of LLC Interests), and Count V (Conversion of
other Personal Property). Thus, Count I (Breach of Contract), Count IV (Conversion of
Promotional Bonuses), and Count VI (Attorneys Fees and Expenses) remain the subject
of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

C)
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A. Count I, Breach of Contract
Defendant Lang alleges that Mr. Toberman and EAR breached the terms of his
employment with EAR by not paying bonuses due to Mr. Lang and for generally diluting
the amount of previously paid bonuses as a result of Mr. Toberman's alleged
embezzlements. Under Mr. Lang's 1999 letter of employment, he was to be paid bonuses
that were tied to the acquisition, refinancing, or disposition of property through what was
referred as "promote pool bonuses". Mr. Lang's right to receive the bonuses were
contingent upon his continued employment with EAR.
Mr. Lang provided the closing documents for the Brookfield Commons property
which closed on August 24,2005, prior to Mr. Lang's termination from EAR. Thus, Mr.
Lang claims that he is entitled to a bonus associated with that property. Additionally, Mr.

o

Lang claims that Mr. Toberman breached the implied duty of good faith inherent in his
employment contract lO when Mr. Toberman allegedly embezzled funds which reduced
the promote pool on other properties out of which Mr. Lang's previous bonuses were
paid or were due.
A promote pool bonus, as described by Mr. Toberman, was a certain employee's
share of what EAR earned on a particular real estate asset. Mr. Toberman provided an
affidavit stating that no promote pool bonuses were paid to any EAR employees in
conjunction with the sale of the Brookfield Commons property and implied that EAR
made no money on the transaction.
To the extent that EAR made profits on the disposition of the Brookfield
Commons property, which occurred prior to Mr. Lang's termination, Mr. Lang would be

C)

10 There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract. S. Bus. Machines of
Savannah v. Norwest Fin. Leasing, 194 Ga. App. 253 (1990) (HIt is a well-recognized principle of contract
law that both parties are under an implied duty of good faith in carrying out the mutual promises of their
contract. ").

14

o

due a portion under the promote pool bonus formula in his employment contract.
However, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that either EAR made profits on
Brookfield Commons or that any EAR employees received a bonus on that particular
property. Without a profit on the property, there is no claim for Mr. Lang's entitlement
to a bonus, and thus no breach.
On Defendant's second claim for breach, he submits the documentation of
numerous unjustified account transfers or debits made by Mr. Toberman on behalf of
several Toberman Entities, including EAR. The unjustified account transfers and debits,
however, were not associated with a particular property for which Mr. Lang was paid a
promote pool bonus, nor was there an attempt to explain the connection between those
account activities and Mr. Lang's rights arising under his employment contract with

o

EAR. Counsel for Defendant made the analogy during oral argument that in a contract to
collect rain water, there is the implied duty not to poke holes in the bucket. Similarly, in
a suit for breach of contract, there must be some attempt made to identify which bucket
was collecting the rain water and/or the amount of rain water lost as a result of the holes.
Without either, the breach of contract claim cannot withstand Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on
Count I of Defendant's counterclaim.

B. Count 4, Conversion of Promotional Bonuses
Defendant Lang alleges that Mr. Toberman and EAR converted promotional
bonuses owed to him under this employment contract with EAR.

o

To prevail on a claim for conversion, a party must demonstrate that they had title
to and right of possession in valuable property, that they made a demand for the property,

15
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and that the other party had possession of the property after refusing to surrender it. City
of College Park v. Sheraton Savannah Corp., 235 Ga. App. 561, 563 (1998).
Georgia courts recognize conversion claims for money, but the allegedly
converted money must be "specific and identifiable, or specifically 'earmarked' for some
particular purpose." Hudspeth v. A & H Constr., 230 Ga. App. 70, 71 (1997); see also,
Unified Servs, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co, 218 Ga. App. 85,89 (1995). Earmarking funds
overcomes the presumption that the party in possession of the money also has title to it.
Adler v. Hertling. 215 Ga. App. 769, 772-74, (1994) (finding the "specific and
identifiable" nature of funds necessary to establish plaintiffs title and right to possess).
Defendant Lang points to the detailed chart of alleged embezzlements as proof that the
converted funds are specifically identifiable or earmarked. As stated above, however, the

o

alleged embezzlement chart details unjustified account transfers between various
Toberman Entities and is not directly tied to any specific property for which Mr. Lang
was owed a promotion pool bonus or an augmentation of a previously paid bonus.
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on
Count IV of Defendant's counterclaim.

C. Count VI, Attorneys Fees and Expenses
Defendant Lang seeks to recover attorneys' fees and expenses associated with this
litigation under O.e.G.A. § 13-6-11. Because all of the claims in Defendant Lang's
counterclaim are disposed of as described in this Order, there is no basis for an award of
attorneys' fees or expenses under the statute.

o
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V. Defendant's Motion to Strike the Contradictory Testimony of
Plaintiff Scott K. Toberman

()

Defendant Lang petitioned this Court to strike paragraphs 4 and 5 of Mr.
Toberman's Affidavit filed on February 15,2007, and several lines of Mr. Toberman's
deposition testimony under the contradictory testimony doctrine. See, Prophecy Corp. v.
Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27 (1999) ("In a Motion for Summary Judgment where
the only evidence presented by the Respondent is contradictory testimony, such
testimony shall be stricken and the evidence shall be construed against him if no
reasonable explanation is offered for the contradiction.").
This Court, having decided Ibe two pending cross motions for summary judgment
without addressing the testimony in question, and in doing so finally resolving all issues

o

in Ibis case, finds this motion moot.

VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment on all Counts of Plaintiffs complaint and GRANTS Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I ,IV, and VI (the remaining counts after
Counts II, III, and V were abandoned by Defendant) of Defendant's counterclaim.

SO ORDERED this

o

#

day of August, 2007.

CYNTHIA D. WRIGHT, JUDGE/or
ELIZABETH E. LONG, SENIOR JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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Copies to:
European American Realty, Ltd.
3525 Piedmont Road
Building 5, Suite 10
Atlanta, Georgia, 30305
Attn: Scott K. Toberman
Scott K. Toberman
2875 Wyngate Road
Atlanta, Georgia 30305
David Nutter
115 Perimeter Center Place
Suite 632
Atlanta, Georgia 30346

J. Steven Parker
Page Perry LLC
1040 Crown Pointe Parkway
Suite 1050
Atlanta, Georgia 30338
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